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REGULATION OF THE INTERNET: THREE PERSISTENT
FALLACIES
JACK GOLDSMITH*
The principal papers have two things in common. They each
claim that the Internet is a novel phenomenon that promises to trans-
form legal regulation. And they each illustrate a fallacy that pervades
the Internet regulation literature. David Post and David Johnson of-
fer a normative argument against governmental regulation of the
Net.' But their argument, like many arguments about jurisdiction
over Internet transactions, erroneously assumes that Cyberspace is a
place hermetically separated from the "real" world. Dan Burk's
analysis of the Internet's effect on national copyright regulation 2 rests
on a common but incomplete understanding of how nations regulate
transnational transactions. Dean Henry Perritt argues that the Inter-
net will strengthen international law.3 This argument exemplifies the
Internet literature's unjustified optimism about the promise of cheap,
plentiful information.
FALLACY I: CYBERSPACE IS A SEPARATE PLACE
Post and Johnson have famously argued that territorial govern-
ments should not regulate Internet transactions.4 Their spillover ef-
fects analysis in this symposium is designed to support this conclusion
in the following way: The Net is oblivious to geographical constraints.
Content providers cannot control their information flows in territorial
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Curt Bradley, Clayton
Gillette, Larry Lessig, Doug Lichtman, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for conversations
and comment, Kyle Gehrmann for excellent research, and the Arnold and Frieda Shure Re-
search Fund for financial support.
1. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent": To-
wards A New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 1055 (1998).
2. See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 943 (1998).
3. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 997 (1998).
4. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1996).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
space because information on the Net appears simultaneously in all
national jurisdictions. One consequence of the Net's architecture is
that territorial regulation of Net information flows creates spillover
effects on Net users in other territories. For example, Minnesota's
threat to impose liability on an Internet gambling site in Antigua
could, by forcing the website operator to shut down or curtail opera-
tions, affect the cost or availability of the same site in territorial juris-
dictions where it is legal. Such spillover effects are illegitimate, Post
and Johnson believe, because the web page operator and users out-
side Minnesota lack voice in or exit from the Minnesota regulation.
Participants in Net transactions, by contrast, can design laws for a-
geographical cyber-communities that permit low-cost voice and exit.
Territorial governments should, therefore, defer to the "rule-sets" de-
signed by the "a-geographical, decentralized, voluntary associations"
on the Net.'
This is an efficiency argument for Net self-regulation. Post and
Johnson have not explained why efficiency is the appropriate crite-
rion of legitimacy in this context. But even assuming it is, their con-
clusion that nations should not regulate the Internet does not follow.
Like many other Internet commentators,6 Post and Johnson are in the
grip of a misleading metaphor. The metaphor is that the Net is an a-
geographical place analogous to, but separate from, territorial space.
5. See Post & Johnson, supra note 1, at 1087. This is my translation, in light of Post and
Johnson's prior work, .of the following important passage from their symposium paper:
We have suggested elsewhere that the Internet calls for a higher degree of deference to
rulemaking within a-geographical, decentralized, voluntary associations, and we be-
lieve that the foregoing provides normative underpinnings for this view. Allowing in-
dividuals to define the boundaries of their own, a-geographical patches by voluntary
movement into and out of decision-making bodies that have little or even no ties to a
particular physical location-what we might call "self-governance"-may allow both
more rapid and more "congruent" responses to shifts in spillover patterns. Individuals
are more likely to be in possession of the relevant information regarding the effect of
spillover on their own welfare and can act more quickly on that information than can
agents at a higher level of the organizational hierarchy (i.e., their elected representa-
tives) to whom that information must be re-directed and re-processed before "official"
boundary realignment can occur. Individuals on whom spillover is most directly con-
centrated can, using their ability to "enter" and "exit" such venues, have the most im-
pact on the rules applicable to the spaces from which the spillover emanates, which
may allow both more rapid and more "congruent" responses to shifts in spillover pat-
terns. In other words, putting boundary-definition in the hands of individuals directly
affected by the rules made within those boundaries may allow a faster and more flexi-
ble response to rapidly changing spillover patterns.
Id. at 1087-88 (footnotes onitted).
6. See, e.g., Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling
Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 9 (1994);
Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self- Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic Personalities, 13
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 6 (1994); David Nimmer, Time and Space, 38 IDEA
501, 502, 525 (1998).
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And it is a very special place. Persons who inhabit it-presumably
content providers, access providers, and users-suffer the effects of
territorial regulations. But (according to Post and Johnson) these
persons can also design private legal orders that permit costless exit
by persons burdened by Net activities. In short, activities in this spe-
cial place do not produce effects beyond it.
The problem is that the Net is not a separate place, and Net users
are not removed from our world.7 They are no more removed than
telephone users, postal users, or carrier-pigeon users. They are in
front of a screen in real space using a keyboard and scanner to com-
municate with someone else, often in a different territorial jurisdic-
tion. And these real-space communications can cause real-world
harms. Internet gambling can decrease in-state gambling revenues
and cause family strife; a book uploaded on the Net can violate an
author's copyright; a chatroom participant can defame someone out-
side the chatroom; terrorists can promulgate bomb-making or kid-
napping tips; merchants can conspire to fix prices by e-mail; a corpo-
ration can issue a fraudulent security; or a pornographer can sell
kiddie porn. In these and many other ways, Net transactions produce
harmful real-world effects. And the people harmed by these transac-
tions often do not have a voice in the transaction and cannot exit
from the private "rule-sets" that facilitate it.
Post and Johnson's conception of the Net as a special place that
produces no real-world harms leads them to overlook important costs
in their efficiency analysis. They worry about the third-party costs of
territorial regulation of the Net. But they ignore the third-party costs
of Net self-regulation. It is these latter third-party costs to its citizens
and residents that a nation worries about and aims to regulate.8 On
its own terms, an efficiency analysis in support of self-regulation must
show that there are fewer spillover effects from self-regulation than
from national regulation. This analysis would require difficult and
controversial valuations that Post and Johnson have not begun to at-
tempt. Such an analysis would need to focus on particular regulatory
contexts rather than on Net regulation per se. It is unlikely that this
analysis would conclude that Net self-regulation is always (or even
usually) more efficient than national regulation.
The spillover effects of Net self-regulation are not the only spill-
7. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1406 (1996).
8. Nations also legitimately regulate for purely paternalistic reasons. I set aside this basis
for regulation for purposes of this argument.
1998]
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overs that the Post and Johnson efficiency analysis ignores. Their
analysis also ignores the spillover effects of territorial regulations that
facilitate Net transactions. Post and Johnson worry about the effects
of Minnesota's regulation of the web page operator in Antigua and
Net gambling users in other countries. But what about the regulation
(or the absence of regulation) that permits the web page operator in
Antigua to transmit the offending content into Minnesota? The An-
tiguan regulation (or non-regulation) facilitates an activity in Antigua
that imposes costs on Minnesota's regulatory efforts and on persons
in Minnesota-family members of gamblers, Minnesota gambling es-
tablishments and their employees, Minnesota schoolchildren who
benefit from taxes on in-state gambling, and so on-without voice in
or exit from the extraterritorial regulation.
Post and Johnson's efficiency analysis provides no basis for
choosing between the trans-jurisdictional costs produced by the com-
peting regulatory regimes in Minnesota and Antigua. This choice can
only be made by virtue of an independent normative theory. Such a
theory would need to explain, among other things, why Minnesota
must forego control over and protection of persons within its territory
to accommodate the users of a new technology in Antigua. Post and
Johnson clearly embrace some such theory, but they have yet to ar-
ticulate it.
FALLACY II: TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS CANNOT REGULATE
THE NON-TERRITORIAL NET
Dan Burk claims that the Net threatens to "put[] information
production into a death spiral of lowered prices and lower produc-
tion, ending in [a] type of underproduction" for digitized goods.9 His
central assumption is that cheap, digitized products made in a terri-
tory with a permissive copyright regime can be sent into territories
with restrictive copyright regimes with impunity.10 "[I]nterdiction of
infringing products may become nearly impossible," he reasons, be-
cause "the sheer volume of Internet traffic would make it prohibi-
tively time consuming to examine each packet coming into the terri-
tory of a copyright restrictive nation, and to sort among them for
potentially infringing copies."" Because territorial governments with
9. See Burk, supra note 2, at 970.
10. See id. at 960-61.
11. Id. at 960.
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restrictive copyright regimes cannot prevent the import of cheap digi-
tal goods made offshore in permissive copyright territories, the re-
strictive regime's copyright protections will become useless. Informa-
tion producers in the restrictive territory will be forced to lower their
prices to compete with the offshore goods.' 2  The information-
fostering incentives of restrictive copyright regimes will thus be de-
feated, leading to a chronic under-supply of digitized goods. 3
Burk embraces a conception of regulation common to Net schol-
arship.14 These scholars are skeptical about the feasibility of territo-
rial regulation of Net transactions for essentially two reasons. First,
they think that territorial governments cannot regulate offshore con-
tent producers who are beyond the state's physical control. Second,
they think that because territorial governments cannot stop the flow
of information packets across territorial boundaries, they cannot
regulate the flow of Net transactions within their borders.
This conception of regulation is surprising. It is surprising be-
cause it comes at a time when so many people-including some who
claim that territorial regulation of the Net will be ineffectual-are
complaining about the adverse consequences for the Net of territorial
regulations. For example, commentators have complained about the
adverse consequences for the Net caused by the European Directive
on Data Protection, 15 United States export controls on encryption
technology, and (directly on point with Burk's analysis) the World In-
tellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Treaties Implementation
Act. 6 Commentators complain about these and other territorial
regulations because these regulations raise the cost-often signifi-
cantly- of Internet transactions.
These complaints belie Burk's assumption that digitized goods
can migrate costlessly across territorial borders. If governments can
raise the cost of Net transactions, they can regulate Net transactions.
17
12. See id. at 970.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV.
INT'L. L.J. 207, 217 (1997); Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1378; Joel R. Reidenberg, Govern-
ing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 913 (1996); John Perry Bar-
low, A Cyberspace Independence Declaration (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://
www.barlow.@eff.org>.
15. See Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31.
16. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong.; Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong.
17. See Lessig, supra note 7, at 1408-10.
1998]
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Burk may be right that-under the current architecture of the Net-a
territorial government has difficulty stopping at its borders digital
goods produced abroad. 18 But this says very little about the efficacy
of the territorial government's restrictive copyright regime. A nation
does not have to inspect every item crossing its borders to effectively
regulate the flow of items within its borders. Instead, it can achieve a
great deal of regulatory control over illegal foreign imports by im-
posing costs on persons and property within its territory.
This form of indirect extraterritorial regulation is how nations
have, in similar contexts, regulated local harms caused by illegal im-
ports that are difficult to stop at the border. Consider extraterritorial
communications that produce local in-state harms. For example, un-
wanted radio and television content can be broadcast from one nation
into another. The content source is beyond the local territorial gov-
ernment's control, and the broadcast signals are difficult to stop at the
borders. Does this mean that a nation cannot control the promulga-
tion of the unwanted foreign content within its borders? Of course
not. A nation can punish local consumers of the content, regulate lo-
cal transmission facilitators, or regulate the technical design of local
reception devices.19 To the extent that these local regulations raise
the local price to obtain foreign content, they regulate the foreign
content even though the source of the content is beyond the nation's
control and the nation cannot stop broadcast signals at its borders.
Consider, similarly, the situation presented by gray-market goods
sold in the United States. A gray-market good is one lawfully made
abroad but imported into the United States without the consent of
the U.S. owner of the intellectual property rights associated with the
good. Gray-market goods possess many of the characteristics of
18. See Burk, supra note 2, at 960-61. It is not impossible to stop digital goods from cross-
ing the border. It is just very costly, at least right now. A nation could choose (as a very few
have) to have no connections to the Net whatsoever. See Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sover-
eignty?- The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 651 (1997).
This is becoming increasingly difficult to do, for it in effect requires shutting off all channels of
international communications. Short of this, nations can, at great cost, achieve significant con-
trol over digital information flows by heavily regulating the channels of communication. For
example, China regulates access to the Internet through (among other means) centrally regu-
lated servers. See id. at 652-54. Many believe that digital identification technology and content
filtering technology will one day permit nations (and individuals) to achieve extraordinary con-
trol over the flow of digital goods. See Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems
and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 137, 139-44 (1997). Burk acknowledges this possibility. See Burk, supra note 2, at 992-93.
19. All three strategies were employed by nations seeking to interrupt cross-border propa-
ganda transmissions. See Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power:
Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336, 344-49 (1991).
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Burk's digital goods. They are manufactured abroad under a regula-
tory regime that makes them less expensive than the identical goods
with valid local trademarks or copyrights. They are relatively easy to
import into the United States because they are difficult and costly to
intercept at the border. Once imported, they have a competitive ad-
vantage over authorized, and thus more expensive, products or cop-
ies. Does the inability to interdict these goods at the borders mean
that domestic intellectual property regulations will be rendered use-
less? No. The United States can regulate domestic users and dis-
tributors of the gray-market goods. This is what it does, for example,
when it permits valid trademark or copyright holders to sue gray-
market distributors and users.20 This regulation of the local demand
side of the gray market can raise the local cost of gray-market goods,
thus protecting the integrity of the goods with valid local trademarks
or copyrights and thereby effectuating the local intellectual property
regulation.
These and similar methods of regulating foreign supply by regu-
lating local persons and property show how nations can regulate the
flow of cheap digital goods made offshore under a permissive regula-
tory regime. The easiest way to control illegal cross-border informa-
tion flows is to enforce the regulation against the local assets of the
foreign supplier of the information. With Net transactions, however,
the foreign supplier will often have no local presence. But the regu-
lating jurisdiction still has many options. It can penalize in-state end-
users who obtain or use the illegal foreign content. It can regulate in-
state hardware and software through which Internet transmissions are
received. 21 It can regulate Internet access providers and other local
firms that facilitate the local transmission of the digital goods. 22 Or it
can regulate local financial intermediaries -banks, credit card com-
panies, and the like-that facilitate Internet transactions.23 In these
20. See, e.g., Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.
1994).
21. Thus, for example, numerous Asian and Middle East countries have set up software
blockades and proxy servers to control Internet content flows, and the Federal Communications
Commission recently mandated V-chip blocking technology in computers capable of receiving
video broadcasting. For a general analysis of this point, see James Boyle, Foucault in Cyber-
space: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 202-04 (1997);
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 893-95 (1996).
22. For example, Internet gambling legislation before Congress in 1998 proposed to
authorize federal and state officials to order Internet service providers to shut down illegal
Internet gambling sites. See Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches
About Internet Regulation, 32 INT'L LAW. 1115 (1998).
23. Cf Matt Beer, The Wagers of the Web: Lawsuit Could Unravel On-line Gaming Indus-
1998]
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and many other ways, local territorial regulations raise the price of lo-
cal transmission and use of the digital good made abroad under the
permissive intellectual property regime.
These enforcement strategies show why it is error to assume that
the Net allows costless migration of digital goods across territorial
borders. In a way, Burk's assumption to the contrary rests on a Post
and Johnson-like view of the Net as a place removed from the real,
territorial world. But whereas Post and Johnson think that the Net is
a separate place that suffers from real-world regulation without pro-
ducing real-world consequences, Burk thinks the Net is a separate
place immune from territorial regulation. Once one recalls that the
Net consists of people using equipment in a territory, it becomes clear
that the territorial government can exercise force over these people
and their equipment to regulate both territorial and extraterritorial
transactions.
Nothing in my analysis suggests that territorial enforcement
strategies will eliminate illegal digital imports. But regulation is rarely
if ever perfect in this sense, and it need not be perfect to be effective.
The relevant question is whether these regulatory strategies will
heighten the cost of transmitting, obtaining, copying, and using digital
goods sufficiently to achieve acceptable control over them. How
much control is "acceptable control"? That depends on several fac-
tors. It first depends on the normative commitments of the regulating
government-the importance to the government of achieving certain
levels of control, and the cost the government is willing to pay to
achieve such control. It also depends on the costs of the govern-
ment's regulations. Some of these costs depend on technological and
other empirical questions that remain unresolved. For example, some
predict that content providers and regulators will be able to assert
near-perfect monitoring of and control over digital goods; however,
others think these predictions are exaggerated. Other costs depend
on the nature of the normative commitment to regulate. It is un-
likely, for example, that regulators care enough about digital goods to
impose a penalty of life imprisonment for their illegal use.
Burk claims that restrictive copyright regimes will be ineffectual
when applied to digital goods on the Net. I have tried to show why he
underestimates the many ways that nations can regulate the Net. The
try, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 17, 1998, at B-1 (describing a California lawsuit arguing that Internet
gambling is illegal and seeking to bar credit card companies and their issuing banks from col-
lecting gambling debts).
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point is important, but by itself narrow. To say that territorial gov-
ernments can raise the cost of local Net transactions and thus regulate
the flow of digital goods is to say very little about the issue that Burk
set out to address, namely the Internet's ultimate effect on national
copyright regulation. The ultimate effect of the Net on the regulation
of digital goods will be informed by this regulation's effect on the Net.
And this in turn will depend on the normative case for regulating digi-
tal goods, the technology of digital goods (and, more broadly, of the
Net), and the monetary and non-monetary costs of regulating digital
goods-issues that are interdependent, changing, and contested.
FALLACY III: OPTIMISM ABOUT CHEAP, PLENTIFUL INFORMATION
Internet commentators tend to be optimistic about the Internet's
transformative capabilities. The Internet, respectable commentators
tell us, will foster tolerance, promote democracy, redistribute wealth,
improve writing and reading skills, destroy trade barriers, and bring
world peace.24
Perritt's sanguine assessment of the Internet's effect on interna-
tional law falls in this vein. The Net makes possible cheap and easy
access to the decisions of courts and legal institutions all over the
world. Perritt believes such access will facilitate harmonization of
public and private international law, 25 thus promoting compliance
with both.26 We have, to be sure, witnessed new harmonization and
enforcement efforts to lower the costs of the prodigious conflict-of-
law challenges presented by Net transactions.27 But Internet law
harmonization will not always (or even usually) be possible. And in
any event, Perritt's claims are much more ambitious. He does not ar-
gue that the Net will facilitate harmonization and enforcement of laws
that govern Internet transactions. Rather, he argues that it will facili-
tate harmonization and enforcement of all of public and private in-
ternational law.
24. See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: How THE COMMUNICATIONS
REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES 119-20, 155, 209-10, 233-34 (1997); MICHAEL L.
DERTOUZOS, WHAT WILL BE: How THE NEW WORLD OF INFORMATION WILL CHANGE OUR
LIVES 82-85 (1997); ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0: A DESIGN FOR LIVING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 83-86, 125 (1997); BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 135-36, 157-58, 184-85 (1995);
NICHOLAS P. NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 55-59 (1995).
25. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1040-42.
26. See id. at 1038-39.




In its enthusiasm for the Internet's transformative potential, this
argument neglects a number of analytical difficulties. Perritt's claim
might prove to be true. But the issue is much more complex than he
suggests.
Harmonization is a term with several meanings.2 What Perritt
means by the term is convergence on a single substantive standard for
a particular issue by courts and lawmakers in different territorial ju-
risdictions. Perritt claims that "as a matter of practical politics, a
judge will be pressed to explain deviations from precedent established
elsewhere. ' 29 It is unclear why and to what extent judges follow
precedent, 30 but the matter is certainly more complicated than this.
Judges who want to minimize decision costs will defer to precedents
established elsewhere. Decision-cost reduction, however, does not
begin to exhaust the factors in judicial decision. Judges who seek in-
fluence or acclaim achieve this end by defying precedents. Judges
also might be moved by personal or national biases. Perritt's claim
that a judge can deviate from a precedent established elsewhere only
at a political cost overlooks the fact that some judges are legally im-
mune from political pressure and that others are legally barred (or
suffer political costs) from following a foreign precedent. It also ig-
nores the fact that the non-efficiency reasons for deferring to prece-
dent-fairness, predictability, and tradition-do not necessarily (or
even usually) apply when a judge in one legal community looks to a
precedent from another.
There is a more fundamental problem with Perritt's harmoniza-
tion claim. Assume with Perritt that judges are leisure-seekers who
suffer political costs from not deferring to precedents established
elsewhere. It still does not follow that cheaper access to legal infor-
mation promotes harmonization. Just as the Net makes it easier to
find precedents in support of a particular legal conclusion, it also
makes it easier to find contrary precedents on point. It will thus be
easier for litigants to present judges with precedents on both sides of
2& See David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization
Claims, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 41, 43 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hu-
dec eds., 1996).
29. Perritt, supra note 3, at 1041.
30. For helpful discussions, see Clayton P. Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law, in
THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: "THE PATH OF THE LAW" AND ITS INFLUENCES
(Steve Burton ed., forthcoming 1999); Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retro-
spective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 994-95 (1995); Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.
1, 39-41 (1993).
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an issue. Judicial choice among competing precedents requires non-
rule-like determinations about the similitude between the precedents
and the case before the judge. In this sense, it is unlikely that even
precedent-deferring judges will, over a range of cases, converge on a
single precedent. The opposite appears likely: a sharp increase in
readily available precedents will, all things being equal, likely increase
rather than decrease judicial variance both within and across jurisdic-
tions."
There are objections to this analysis. Harmonization can take
place in many contexts and over many ranges of jurisdictional differ-
ence. Take an extreme case of two jurisdictions, A and B, that have
different conceptions of tort law and no knowledge of the other. In
this situation, a change in technology that makes it cheap and easy for
A to access the precedents of B will increase the likelihood that B will
influence the tort law of A, and that A will conform to B's view of
tort law, thereby promoting harmonization of tort law between the
two jurisdictions. A related objection is that the harmonizing tenden-
cies of easy access to new precedents might be masked by the mis-
leading appearance of judicial variance. The fact that it is easier for
litigants to bring contrary precedents to a judge's attention might
make us think that there is less harmonization, when in fact the un-
derlying influence of the new precedents creates greater harmoniza-
tion across jurisdictions than would have been the case without the
new precedents.
These examples remind us of the complexity of the harmoniza-
tion problem. They show that the Net might promote marginal har-
monization even if it does not lead to complete harmonization. More
broadly, they show how difficult it is to predict the Net's conse-
quences for legal harmonization, for in the abstract we cannot tell
which dominates: the harmonizing tendencies of access to new legal
precedents or the non-harmonizing tendencies of too many prece-
dents. I do not claim that the Net's easy access to more precedents
will, on balance, defeat rather than promote harmonization; I only
contend that the question is very complex, and that Perritt's predic-
tions about the Net's harmonizing tendencies are unjustifiably opti-
mistic.
31. For historical examples of the apparently dis-harmonizing effects of technologies that
made it easier to copy and distribute legal information, see M. ETHAN KATSH, THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 35-48 (1989); Grant Gilmore, Legal
Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1040-44 (1961).
1998]
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My analysis thus far has been limited to the Net's effect on the
common law process. Perritt's harmonization claim is no more con-
vincing when we move to judicial interpretations of law produced by
public and private international lawmakers. 32 To the extent that the
Net makes trans-national communication easier, Perritt's claim that it
facilitates uniform international lawmaking might be true. Assuming
that nations adopt these uniform laws, Perritt's further claim that "it
is logical that courts from different states would decide similarly the
same issues under the same law" 33 does not follow. Because of the
significant conflicts of national interest that must be resolved, uniform
international laws tend to be crafted not as rules but rather as stan-
dards.34 Standards are easier to agree on precisely because the con-
tent of the law is not determined ex ante, but rather is left to the law
interpreter. And the law interpreters in international contexts are
decentralized national courts, which are not likely to interpret stan-
dards in a uniform fashion.35 It is possible that the harmonizing ten-
dencies of applying the same standard minus the non-harmonizing
aspects of standards application will, in the aggregate, lead to greater
harmony than would have been the case in the absence of a uniform
international law. But it is difficult to say so for sure at the level of
generality and confidence that Perritt asserts.
Perritt's claim that the Net will harmonize customary interna-
tional law ("CIL") is his least convincing. Perritt invokes the tradi-
tional definition of CIL: a customary practice followed from a sense
of legal obligation. This gentle definition masks enormous conceptual
disputes about the proper sources of CIL. CIL has always been bur-
dened by uncertainties about the appropriate criteria for identifying
customary state practice and the elusive sense of legal obligation. 36
The multiplication of nation states in the post-World War II period
has exacerbated these uncertainties. Among many other problems is
the fact that custom-development and custom-identification become
more difficult as the number of actors and the range of their interac-
tions increase. The identification of CIL has become even more diffi-
cult during the past quarter century because the traditional focus on
32. That is, treaty makers and private organizations that develop model international laws.
33. Perritt, supra note 3, at 1040.
34. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 597, 651 (1995) (making similar point in context of private legislatures).
35. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 985 (1995).
36. See David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the
Future of Customary International Law, 39 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 198, 199-208 (1996).
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the actual practice of states has begun to shift to an even vaguer "con-
sensus" criterion that looks to treaties (ratified or not), General As-
sembly Resolutions, and domestic enactments as additional sources of
CIL.37 CIL today is bedeviled by an overabundance of potential
sources and little definitive guidance about source hierarchies. The
Internet's easy and cheap access to all of these sources makes the
problem worse, not better.38
CONCLUSION
The Net creates many new and interesting problems, and prom-
ises, for legal regulation. The first generation of Net scholarship has
tended to exaggerate these problems and promises, however, by fo-
cusing exclusively on what is new about the Net and overlooking what
is old about it.
37. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815,839-40 (1997) (discussing this trend).
38. Perritt also thinks that the Internet will promote compliance with international law be-.
cause knowledge is a prerequisite to compliance, and the Internet increases knowledge of the
law. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1038-39. I have already explained why easier access to more
legal sources does not necessarily (or even probably) lead to coherence in law or an increased
knowledge about law. Here, as elsewhere, Perritt mistakenly views law as an objectively dis-
coverable, uncontroversially ordered phenomenon, access to which the Internet will enhance.
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